1	DI	STRICT COURT OF GUAM
2		AUG 21 2003
3		MARY L. M. MORAN CLERK OF COURT
4		GLENK OF COURT
5	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF	GUAM ()
6	TERRITORY OF GUAM	
7	* * *	
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9	AMERICOPTERS, LLC,	COURT OF APPEALS
10	Plaintiff,) CASE NO.
11	vs.)) CIVIL CASE
12	FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,) NO. 03-00005)
13	Defendant.))
14)
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16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDI	NGS
17	BEFORE	
18	THE HONORABLE JOHN S. UNP	INGCO
19	THE HONORNEED COME OF CHI	111300
20	MOMTON HO DIGWIGG TOD	
	MOTION TO DISMISS FOR	
21	LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURI	
22	FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 20	03
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1	APPEARANCES:
2	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
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7	
8	FOR THE DEFENDANT:
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14	Federal Aviation Administration Office of the Chief Counsel
15	BY: KENNETH CAPLAN, Esq.
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1	HAGATNA, GUAM; FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 2003; 10:33 A.M.	
2	* * *	
3	THE CLERK: Civil Case 03-00002, Jan's	
4	Helicopter Service Inc. versus the Federal Aviation	
5	Administration, and Civil Case 03-00005, Americopters	
6	LLC versus Federal Aviation Administration, motion to	
7	dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.	
8	Counsel, please state your appearances.	
9	MR. SCHWAB: Your Honor, Mikel Schwab on	
10	behalf of the United States; and by courtesy of the	
11	Court, I have Kenneth Caplan on the phone as well.	
12	THE COURT: Okay.	
13	MR. LEDGER: Good morning, Your Honor. David	
14	Ledger on behalf of Americopters and on behalf of	
15	Jan's. And with me is Mr. John Walker representing	
16	both companies.	
17	THE COURT: Mr. Caplan on the line?	
18	MR. CAPLAN: Yes, sir.	
19	THE COURT: State your appearance.	
20	MR. CAPLAN: Kenneth Caplan, Office of Chief	
21	Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration.	
22	THE COURT: Gentlemen, I've read the papers	
23	here. And, Mr. Caplan, I'm kind of disappointed in you	
2 4	in not including with your brief Air One Helicopters	
25	Inc. versus Federal Aviation Administration decided	

June 12, 1996; it seems to rule squarely against you. 1 2 I'm kind of puzzled as to why you didn't include that in your brief. You do have an ethical obligation to 3 this court; because we're only a territory doesn't mean 4 5 we're not a Federal Court. MR. CAPLAN: I understand, Your Honor. 6 7 don't believe the Air One Helicopters case is 8 necessarily pertinent here, Your Honor. 9 MR. SCHWAB: Your Honor, if I may? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. SCHWAB: The case of Air One Helicopters 12 is something that I included. I ran across it last 13 night and thought it was very relevant for one reason, 1 4 and that's the underlying charge, that the bureaucratic 15 snag can be treated as a final order. 16 THE COURT: That's right. MR. SCHWAB: It doesn't detract from our basic 17 18 argument which is the argument I've also added with 19 Mr. Caplan, it really doesn't detract from our basic 20 argument that it belongs in the Ninth Circuit because 21 it's the Ninth Circuit that gives relief in that --THE COURT: Well, but the issue here is this 22 is a bureaucracy, a bureaucratic snag, that's the core 23 2.4 issue here. And that's what's shared by this case of 25 Air One Helicopters.

1	And, Mr. Caplan, I wish you'd take your	
2	blinders off because that's exactly what's happened	
3	here. And you argued this case so you knew it was a	
4	bureaucratic snag, and that's what we're facing here in	
5	these two cases before me today. So you're cautioned,	
6	you better start looking and look well at the cases	
7	that are relevant, especially those that you yourself	
8	argued before the Ninth Circuit, because I don't take	
9	it lightly when lawyers keep things away from the	
10	court, I think that's very unfair. And you have an	
11	ethical duty before this court to let known the	
12	authorities that are against you. You shouldn't let	
13	your or put your co-counsel in a position where he	
14	has to be the one speaking up for you. I don't like	
15	that at all, so you better change your ways.	
16	MR. CAPLAN: I understand, Your Honor.	
17	THE COURT: Now give me your best shot,	
18	defendant FAA. Who's speaking?	
19	MR. CAPLAN: Your Honor, with respect to the	
20	case involving the Caribou aircraft, I believe that was	
21	Jan's Helicopter.	
22	THE COURT: Yes.	
23	MR. CAPLAN: The position of the agency is	
24	that, that in the first instance, in order to operate	
25	in the United States, in the U. S. territories and its	

possessions, a foreign registered aircraft, such as this one, requires economic authority from the Department of Transportation. And Jan's Helicopters did not seek and/or obtain that authority, and therefore the statement of the inspector to that effect was that the aircraft could not operate legally in the United States was the correct position. And that Jan's Helicopters remedy is simply to seek that authority from the Department of Transportation, which is of course separate and apart from the Federal Aviation Administration.

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THE COURT: Yeah. But what you're saying to them, oh, in our opinion, by the way, is that this is not the final word on this thing. We're just telling you, go to another agency, but our opinion is not a final ruling on this, but you still can't land and use the facilities, that's the other half of the equation.

MR. CAPLAN: I don't believe that the statement from the inspector to that effect, and I think that was one ruse to the Airport Authority was --constituted a final action on the part of the agency. That was the inspector's opinion, and we would agree, at least from what I understand the nature of the operation that that was probably the correct opinion, because it was a commercial operation and required

authority from the Department of Transportation, and it wasn't fair, and therefore, Jan's Helicopters could not operate legally under those circumstances. And that -- but it wasn't a final agency decision, it wasn't an order that the agency itself considered to be final.

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In fact, I believe it was the September letter from Mr. Balton, who is the regional counsel for the FAA for the Western Pacific Region, that made it very clear to Mr. Ledger that in neither of these cases were the actions of these inspectors to be considered to be final actions of the agency, because those inspectors weren't authorized to make those kinds of decisions, and that only he as the regional counsel or certain other individuals chosen or delegated could do so, and therefore, these were not decisions that were in effect binding on the plaintiffs in these cases.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you something here, Mr. Caplan. Let's suppose that this outfit had chosen to violate Balton's letter and whatever other direction that they were given that's not a final order by the FAA, okay, let's suppose that they said, well, forget this, we'll still land anyway; what would happen to them?

MR. CAPLAN: If they chose to violate?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CAPLAN: Then they would act at their peril, certainly, because the government, the FAA could certainly take appropriate action to seek either compliance through perhaps a cease and desist order, or perhaps seek an enforcement action to take punitive actions through either certificate action or civil penalty. They would act at their peril certainly.

THE COURT: Well, that's the problem. You have just said what is the problem here, they act at their peril, meaning that there are sanctions that can be imposed, court orders that can be imposed, possibly even contempt.

MR. CAPLAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You're saying on the one hand that this is not a final action, you're saying you can't land, but on the other hand, you know, this is not a final order. Yet, if you violate this order I will smack your fingers and crush them. You know, how can you have it both ways? I have a great deal of difficulty with you talking out of both sides of your mouth in this kind of argument.

MR. CAPLAN: Your Honor, we don't believe we're doing so. We believe that in this case and under any statute or federal regulations, the persons that are subjected to it have an obligation to obey those

regulations, those statutes, and act at their peril when they fail to do so. And that it doesn't require the agency to take affirmative action to seek prosecution, because that's part of the prosecutorial discretion here as to whether to act or not to act.

THE COURT: Well, you're side-stepping the issue here. The issue is that that action, regardless of whether you call it a final act, a final order or whatever, that action has consequences when it's violated, okay. But yet, you have issued that order without giving the required requisite hearing that's required under the statute. That's the issue here. You know, it's not -- prosecutorial discretion has nothing to do with it.

The issue here is whether this court has jurisdiction over this case, whether this ruling, or this letter or whatever, however you choose to characterize it, final response or whatever, is an order that should be appealed to the Ninth Circuit, whether this court has jurisdiction over that. That's the nub of the issue here. And it seems to me that you are saying, well, this is not a final order, on the one hand, but the District Court can't touch it because the Court of Appeals is the one with jurisdiction. See where I'm heading here?

MR. CAPLAN: I think I understand, Your Honor.

And I, with all due respect to the court, I don't think

I agree with that, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Well, you don't have to agree with me, it's just that it seems to me the logic of it is very compelling. And I'm not angry at you, I'm just kind of excited, because I'm following this logic, and it's leading me to a bureaucratic snag.

Where are these people going to go? We're halfway around the world; where are these people going to go for direction? They've got to go to the local FAA person, FAA person shows them this order that has punitive sanctions, even criminal sanctions possibly based on what you have said, yet you maintain that that is not a final order appealable to the Ninth Circuit. What's the logic here?

MR. CAPLAN: Well, I understand what you're saying, Your Honor, but I believe that the answer is that there are times when that is -- in effect the result is that the government is not required to take affirmative action in these cases to resolve an issue. That the, in effect, the litigants here, the plaintiffs have been placed on notice by the federal government that if they engage in this action, it may, the opinion of at least knowledgeable officials, be inconsistent

with the regulations and the statute, and that they act at their peril.

I don't think I can go much beyond that, sir.

I understand what you're saying, though, that it places these activities in limbo, that they run the risk of being prosecuted perhaps, of having a cease and desist order taken against them. But, of course, if that happens, Your Honor, they will then have the opportunity to litigate the agency's position, and to argue that what they did was appropriate. It may affect their ability to take action in the meantime. They may take the risk but --

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, the main thing here is that it seems, we're looking at fairness here too, and that is, that for a governmental agency to have so much power and yet to be trying to, on the one hand to try to say, well, it's not really a final decision; on the other hand saying, well, you can't take us to the court in that jurisdiction, you've got to go to the Ninth Circuit. You know, we're out in the Western Pacific in the middle of nowhere.

And that's the other thing troubling me, is that for a governmental agency to be fence sitting, if I may use that term, fence sitting and then choosing the route, tactically choosing the route, when it's

engaged in litigation, the route it's then going to 1 2 ultimately take as to the characterization of its 3 actions, you know, there's a question of fairness here. 4 MR. CAPLAN: May I respond to that, Your 5 Honor? 6 THE COURT: Well, let me just finish my 7 thought and then I'll give you an opportunity. 8 We're not a huge land mass out here, we're a bunch of scattered little specks in the ocean, and 9 10 things like landing rights have a bit of value to them 11 out here. You know, where else are they going to go? 12 Of course they have to go through the FAA, and the FAA 13 has to -- if the FAA is a regulatory agency, then, by 14 gosh, act like a regulatory agency and state the 15 decision, state the opinion and then let's go forward. 16 But to do this kind of a thing is unfair, that is that, 17 oh, this is just an advisory opinion, but you can't 18 litigate it in District Court, you've got to go to the 19 Court of Appeals. And what you're saying in the second 20 part is that, but it is a final opinion. You see where 21 I'm kind of really -- seems to be --22 MR. CAPLAN: Yes, I understand, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: I'm really, you know, that's hard 24 to break out of. So enlighten me. 25 Well, Your Honor, I will try to. MR. CAPLAN:

I think I would like to start by saying that 1 assuming that, you know, that they're correct in their 2 position that these were final positions, agency 3 decisions and that they are judicially reviewable, 4 I would like to go to the second point about where 5 they're reviewable. And we believe, the agency 6 7 believes that there is no question but they can only be reviewed by the Ninth Circuit, and that they 8 certainly, the plaintiffs would certainly get a full 9 10 and fair review by the Ninth Circuit. 11 And that they will be able to litigate these issues, not only litigate the issue of whether it was 12 or was not a final decision, but if it were final 13 14 decisions, whether the agency acted appropriately. But we believe, truly believe that that's where it 15 16 needs to be litigated, not in District Court. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Caplan? 18 MR. CAPLAN: Not from me, sir. And, Your 19 Honor, I apologize deeply about the Air One, I did not 2.0 intend at all to mislead the court, I do regret that 21 very much. THE COURT: Okay. Accepted. Anything else? 22 23 MR. SCHWAB: Your Honor, Mr. Caplan is being gracious. I should take full responsibility for any 24 25 case that's cited or not cited; that was my signature

and my submission. I do apologize. When I did look at it and discussed it with Mr. Caplan, he didn't object to my bringing it into court. It doesn't, of course, undermine our underlying argument that we're in the wrong court.

But as to this argument with Jan's Helicopter, everything Your Honor has been saying, I have to express some amusement because I've had the same concerns myself over the last two days of interaction with Mr. Caplan on this. But as to Jan's Helicopter, I think it's a little different than it is as to Americopters. In Jan's Helicopter, the analogy would be as if a policeman came in, saw someone renting a car and said, hey, you don't have a driver's license, he's not pulling them over, he's not giving them a ticket, he's just saying, you don't have a license.

And in Jan's Helicopter case, they've got a commercial airplane that's registered in the Philippines and they're doing business, and they say, hey, you need a license; the airport agrees they need a license, when I look at it I agree they need a license, and they need to go to Department of Transportation to get that. So going back to FAA and putting the hammer on them and saying, give us a final order, give us a hearing, is not appropriate. Go back to DOT. And

1	we're just bystanders that are certainly official	
2	bystanders here saying, you're not supposed to be	
3	driving.	
4	THE COURT: But let's take the logic to the	
5	other conclusion. What happens if they go to DOT and	
6	DOT says, well, we can only do so much for you, the	
7	rest is up to FAA because they control the air traffic	
8	or they control fines.	
9	MR. SCHWAB: Then we're back at Americopters.	
10	THE COURT: That's right.	
11	MR. SCHWAB: We're in sort of the washing	
12	machine where you're spinning.	
13	THE COURT: That's right, and we need to break	
14	out of it. That's all I'm looking for is a way to	
15	break out of this snag.	
16	MR. SCHWAB: And without getting into the next	
17	case, I'll just say that that takes place in the Ninth	
18	Circuit.	
19	THE COURT: Yes. So that's your position?	
20	MR. SCHWAB: It is, Your Honor.	
21	THE COURT: Thank you.	
22	MR. SCHWAB: Thank you.	
23	THE COURT: Let's hear from the plaintiffs.	
24	Mr. Ledger.	
25	MR. LEDGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank	

you.

extent, is more of the same, more punting, more hit and run, more dodging, and an attempt to drag the court into trying to resolve the dispute on the merits. As to the reference to the DOT, it has nothing to do with the reason we're here this morning. We're here this morning on a jurisdictional argument.

And in terms of listening to what the court has had to say, in terms of the effect of the initial communications that were put out by the FAA, and as the court is aware, when we tried to utilize the administrative procedure to the letter we were told we weren't entitled to do that because the orders weren't final.

Now with respect to Jan's, I'd like to put something -- I'd like to put that case in a little bit clearer perspective, perhaps something that was lost on the court or was not indicated early on. And this in effect goes to one of our arguments that we're making in favor of jurisdiction, which is the deprivation of constitutional due process.

And it's Exhibit A in the Jan's case which is essentially the, call it what you want, we called it an order. That's the communication from Mr. Ziegler to

the Airport Authority essentially grounding Caribou; and not only was there not any notice of that order given to Jan's. And Mr. Walker was the pilot of the aircraft on the day of this event, Mr. Walker went to the airport and crewed the airplane, prepared it to fly, taxied it to the runway, requested clearance from the Guam Airport Authority, and at that point was told, sorry, John, you're grounded, you can't fly. Well, why not.

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Well, Mr. Walker goes back to his office, calls the airport, says, what's the problem. And in response to that question, Mr. Ziegler's e-mail was faxed to Mr. Walker.

Now, again, to put it in perspective of fairness, the man goes to the airport, crews and fuels his airplane to do basically what was amounting to a maintenance flight, had nothing to do with this underlying dispute as to whether it was a commercial activity authorized by DOT or not, and he's told he can't fly.

Now, the due process violation of that to me is pretty apparent. And whether or not there's jurisdiction in this court because the order was final or not final, or whether it's reviewable by the Ninth Circuit, there hasn't been any reply or contrary

argument to the fact that we're entitled to be here to litigate that constitutional violation. There was no due process whatever, they didn't follow their own CFR. And in addition, the pilot goes out and fires up the airplane and was told he can't fly it.

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So aside from any issue of whether the order was final, and obviously it's fence sitting and they're trying to have it both ways, there's no reason why we can't be here and litigate the constitutional violation; this court has jurisdiction over that claim.

I also notice in the papers that one of the end runs that they're attempting is that, well,

Mr. Ziegler's order, letter, call it what you will,

really didn't do anything. It was the Guam Airport

Authority that shut the Caribou down, so if you've got

a beef, take it to them. Well, that's pretty

transparent. I mean, Mr. Ziegler sent a letter to the

Airport Authority, this aircraft is not authorized to

fly, the Airport Authority did what it was supposed to

do and followed what Mr. Ziegler said, they grounded

the airplane. So it's just ludicrous for them to come

in here and say, well, it's not our problem, it's the

Airport Authority's problem.

Again, the issue that's been raised with respect to whether or not the aircraft was authorized

1	to do what it was doing under DOT regulation is just	
2	more of the same, more hit and run; that's the	
3	underlying merits of the case, and it has nothing to do	
4	with this morning's proceedings. It is a different	
5	subject, it is a different issue from the	
6	constitutional violation that we allege occurred.	
7	But that's for another day, it's not for this morning.	
8	So I don't think that the FAA has in their	
9	verbal reply today come up with any compelling reason	
10	that the motion should be entertained, and we've asked	
11	the court to retain jurisdiction over the claims as	
12	stated in the complaint.	
13	That's all I have, Your Honor. If the court	
14	has questions?	
15	THE COURT: No, thank you. Your position was	
16	very well stated.	
17	MR. LEDGER: Thank you.	
18	THE COURT: Appreciate the way you have	
19	expressed it.	
20	Any few words of rebuttal from the defense?	
21	This is their motion.	
22	MR. SCHWAB: Your Honor, I would just disagree	
23	on one thing, that the hit and run analogy I think is	
24	incorrect. I think what the FAA is doing, which they	
25	have to do as officials, is point out the obvious;	

permit, they have to say it. It looks that way to everyone who looks at it, it looks like they're registered in the Philippines, they're doing business by transporting things down to the islands, they're in commerce. The FAA, unlike in the Americopters case, isn't the one that grants the relief on that, it's the Department of Transportation.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. The court is going to rule, and then follow up with a more complete ruling -- I shouldn't say more complete ruling -- it will rule, and it will expand on the rationale of its ruling in a written order to follow.

The court's first ruling is that the Zeigler July 31st, 2002 e-mail which resulted in the grounding of the Caribou and Inspector Kanae's June 24th, 2002 letter directing that Americopters cease and desist its operations both possessed the requisite finality. Both of these actions by the FAA denied the plaintiffs rights that they previously enjoyed.

As proof of the definiteness of the FAA's position on September 19, 2002, Regional Counsel Balton issued a final response denying Mr. Ledger's repeated requests for hearings. The Ziegler e-mail and Kanae

letter had a direct and immediate effect on the day to day operations of plaintiffs' business. In fact, upon receiving the Ziegler e-mail, Guam Airport Authority immediately complied with its terms by grounding the Caribou and denying the aircraft and its crew access to the taxiway and runway. Additionally, Americopters shut down its operations from Chuck's Steak House and conducted its flight operations from another location on Guam. Clearly, the FAA's actions are final orders within the meaning of Section 46110(a).

Accordingly, jurisdiction in this case is proper with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. And as to the paucity of the record in this case, this record is sufficient to permit the Ninth Circuit to evaluate the Plaintiff's claims. Reference Southern California Aerial Advertisers Association, 881 F.2d at 676.

As far as the constitutional challenge, plaintiff contends that they're challenging the constitutionality of the FAA act, the court rules that while that may be so, it's still so inextricably intertwined with the procedures and other merits -- so inescapably intertwined with FAA procedures and merits surrounding the FAA's orders. And so the subject matter jurisdiction is properly vested exclusively in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as mandated by

Section 46110(a). Therefore, the motion to dismiss is granted.

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this case. I think that government agencies need to take a stance on what it is that they're supposed to be doing. And this placement of people in a state of limbo, whether inadvertent or purposeful, is something that really does a disservice to all government agencies who really have a genuinely, a genuinely meritorious oversight function and regulatory function. So, however, the court's hands are tied on this one, the precedent is compelling that it is the Ninth Circuit. And the court's ruling that these orders are indeed final orders, or these letters are final orders, compels the conclusions that the court has drawn.

I will follow up with a more comprehensive written order that expands on the rationale, but I don't like to keep you people hanging. But this is a very interesting case, compelling reasons. I thought I was going to sleep last night but it kept me awake longer that I had intended. And my compliments to both sides. But I do hope that this matter is pursued vigorously, because this is a kind of an issue as a practical matter we out here in the middle of the Western Pacific, we really need to get finalized

1 because of the scarcity of facilities here, and 2 alternate facilities, and this will be a very important 3 issue. 4 Thank you very much to both sides. 5 MR. LEDGER: Your Honor, I would just like to 6 bring one issue to the court's attention, and that is, 7 although I haven't looked in great detail at perhaps 8 some time deadlines that we would be required to meet 9 with respect to agency administrative actions and 10 filing in the Ninth Circuit, and what I'm asking the 11 court to clarify is that as of today the court has 12 deemed the Kanae correspondence and the Ziegler 13 correspondence to be --14 THE COURT: Final orders. 1.5 MR. LEDGER: -- final orders that have been 16 fully adjudicated by the administrative process and now 17 ripe for review by the Ninth Circuit. 18 THE COURT: Yes. Well, I've made the ruling, 19 but it's not official until we have entered the order. 20 That's my understanding. 21 MR. LEDGER: That's fine, Your Honor. We'll 22 wait. 23 THE COURT: But I will be coming out with the 24 order fairly quick, you can rest assured, by next week, 25 one week at the latest, hopefully sooner. I do want to

1 see this issue get up to the Ninth Circuit fairly 2 quickly because I think it's an important issue. 3 looking at, reading the case law, it's something that 4 needs to be clarified further, and hopefully the 5 availability of the administrative procedures will be 6 both clarified and made much more pertinent. MR. LEDGER: We've heard what the court has to 8 say this morning and the efforts of the court are not 9 being wasted because the issue will be taken out once 10 the written decision comes out. 11 THE COURT: I believe I have voiced some 12 strong concerns on this. I'm not angry at anybody, I 13 get kind of excited when I'm grappling with an issue 14 that I think is so intriguing, and I think this is one 1.5 of those issues that deserves both. And I do wish both 16 sides the very best. 17 MR. LEDGER: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 19 MR. CAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 (Proceedings concluded at 11:03 a.m.) 21 22 23 24 25

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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3	CITY OF AGANA)
4) ss. TERRITORY OF GUAM)
5	
6	I, Wanda M. Miles, Official Court Reporter
7	of the District Court of Guam, do hereby certify the
8	foregoing pages 1-24, inclusive, to be a true and
9	correct transcript of the shorthand notes taken by me
10	of the within-entitled proceedings, at the date and
11	time therein set forth.
12	Dated this 20th day of August, 2003.
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14	Wanda W. Wills
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